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OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Michele Black filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and state law alleging that various police and fire 
officials, as well as a county and township, violated her 
constitutional rights in connection with criminal proceedings 
against her.  The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the District Court 
granted these motions. 
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 Two issues are now before us on appeal from the order 
granting the motions to dismiss.  The first issue is whether the 
District Court erred in determining that Black was not 
“seized” as required for a Fourth Amendment malicious 
prosecution claim.  The second issue is whether the District 
Court erred in finding that Black’s Fourteenth Amendment 
due process claim for fabricated evidence required that she be 
convicted at trial, since she was acquitted.  We hold that the 
answer is yes for both issues.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I.1 
 
 On November 21, 2012, a fire broke out at the home 
where Black had grown up in Lower Merion Township, 
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.  Black’s mother had sold 
the home two days before.  Originally, the closing date was 
set for November 30, 2012, but it was moved up so the buyers 
could upgrade the wiring before they moved in.  The buyers 
could not obtain homeowner’s insurance unless the old wiring 
was upgraded because it was viewed as a fire hazard.  Black’s 
mother entered into a post-settlement possession addendum 
which allowed her to remove her possessions from the home 
while the buyer’s contractors upgraded the wiring.  
 
 The fire broke out in the third floor of the home.  
Black was in the home helping her mother remove 
possessions,2 while the buyer’s electricians were upgrading 
the wiring.  The fire resulted in a “V” pattern of fire damage 
extending from a 220-volt electrical outlet.  The electricians 
extinguished the fire before they called the fire department.  
After arriving at the home, the Gladwyne Fire Chief called 
the dispatcher to report an electrical fire. 
 
                                              
1 These facts come from Black’s Second Amended Complaint 
and are construed in the light most favorable to her.  See 
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002).   
2 The fact that Black was in the home when the fire occurred 
does not appear to be specifically alleged in the complaint.  
But both parties state it in their briefs, Black Br. 3; 
Montgomery County Br. 3, and it is implied by subsequent 
events.     
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 Defendant Deputy Fire Marshal Frank Hand and his 
supervisor defendant Chief Fire Officer Charles McGarvey 
arrived at the scene.  Hand was not an electrical expert, but he 
disassembled the electrical outlet where the fire had started.  
Hand could not determine that the fire was accidental, so he 
called the District Attorney’s Office and the state police for 
help.   Hand concluded that the fire was intentionally started 
and was not an electrical fire.  Despite fire damage on the 
electrical outlet, Hand did not preserve the outlet, supporting 
brackets, electrical box, or the outlet cover.  Hand 
intentionally misrepresented his findings that the wire to the 
outlet had been cut 18 inches from the outlet to support the 
proposition that there was no power source for the outlet.  His 
supervisor, defendant McGarvey, witnessed the fire scene and 
assisted Hand with his investigation.   
 
 Defendant State Trooper Thomas Pomponio, an 
alternate deputy fire marshal, arrived at the scene.  After he 
learned that the wire had already been cut, Pomponio 
concluded the fire was caused by an open flame, ruling out 
that the outlet caused the fire.  Pomponio did not inspect the 
electrical panel in the basement as he normally would because 
he heard that it had already been inspected.  Had he done so, 
he would have discovered that the fire was an electrical one. 
 
 Defendant John Fallon, a certified fire inspector, 
arrived at the home, examined the outlet and concluded the 
damage was caused by an open flame, not by the electrical 
outlet.  Fallon determined that the outlet was not energized 
when the fire occurred.  In arriving at his conclusion, Fallon 
relied on the word of one of the electricians, rather than 
personally inspecting the panel box in the basement as 
required by protocol.   
 
 A box of matches was found on another windowsill in 
the room where the fire started, and Fallon, Pomponio, and 
Hand assumed these matches were used to start the fire, 
despite evidence that this was an electrical fire.  These three 
defendants never tested the box of matches for DNA or 
fingerprints, or analyzed whether the match strike pad had 
been used.  
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 Shortly after the fire broke out, Fallon, Pomponio, 
Hand, as well as defendant Detectives Gregory Henry and 
Bryan Garner, first questioned the electricians.  Black “was 
advised that she was not free to leave the premises until she 
was questioned by police, and was escorted by police to and 
from the bathroom.”  Appendix (“App.”) A41.  These 
defendants did not check the veracity of the electricians’ 
story.  During the interrogation of Black, the officers 
immediately accused Black of setting the fire.  Black also 
alleges that at the end of her interrogation, Fallon told her that 
if she did not surrender herself to them at a later date, a 
warrant would be issued for her arrest, the defendants would 
have her hometown District Attorney’s Office in California 
send a police officer to arrest her, she would remain in 
custody until extradited, and remain in jail until her 
arraignment. 
 
 Black alleges that Fallon made several material 
falsehoods and omissions in an affidavit of probable cause to 
arrest her.  These falsehoods and omissions included:  failing 
to report that the fire started at an electrical outlet; failing to 
mention that the Gladwyne Fire Chief first reported an 
electrical fire; failing to mention that electricians were at the 
scene to fix the wiring; failing to mention that the circuit 
panel was never checked in the basement; and failing to 
mention that the outlet and live wires were never tested. 
 
 Black returned home to California after the fire.  On 
December 17, 2012, Pennsylvania authorities issued an arrest 
warrant for Black for arson endangering persons, risking 
catastrophe, criminal mischief, and recklessly endangering 
another person.  Black flew to Pennsylvania on December 18, 
2012 for her arraignment.  She was arraigned and was 
released on $50,000 unsecured bail.3  A condition of her bail 
was that Black was required to appear at all subsequent 
                                              
3 Release on unsecured bail bond means “[r]elease 
conditioned upon the defendant’s written agreement to be 
liable for a fixed sum of money if he or she fails to appear as 
required or fails to comply with the conditions of the bail 
bond.  No money or other form of security is deposited.”  Pa. 
R. Crim. P. 524(C)(3). 
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proceedings.  Black was then required to be fingerprinted and 
photographed at a police station, which took over an hour.  
 
 Black again returned to her home in California.  On 
January 24, 2013, Black flew from California to Pennsylvania 
to attend her preliminary hearing.  She flew from California 
to Pennsylvania for twelve out of fourteen pre-trial 
conferences because the Court Notices for each conference 
said that if she did not appear a bench warrant would be 
issued for her arrest.  
 
 Prior to trial, Black retained a fire expert, John J. 
Lentini, who concluded that the fire was unequivocally an 
electrical one, not an arson.  Lentini reached out to Hand to 
discuss his findings and to review the photographs of the fire 
with Hand.  Lentini never received a response from Hand.  
Black’s counsel emailed the assistant district attorney 
assigned to the case to advise him about Lentini’s findings 
and to offer to meet the prosecutor and his expert.  The 
assistant district attorney never responded to this offer.      
 
 On April 23, 2014, Black’s trial began.  Fallon and 
Hand offered evidence at trial that the outlet was not 
energized and that the wire was cut.  Photographs offered by 
Black, however, taken the day of the fire show the wire was 
intact.  The photographs offered and explained by Fallon and 
Hand appear to have been taken later.  Black presented 
evidence that the defendants fabricated and suppressed 
exculpatory evidence.  On April 24, 2014, she was found not 
guilty of all charges.  The jury deliberated for less than forty 
minutes. 
 
 Subsequently, Black filed this lawsuit on November 
21, 2014.  She filed the Second Amended Complaint on June 
11, 2015.  Black named as defendants Montgomery County, 
Detective John T. Fallon, Lower Merion Township, Detective 
Gregory Henry, Detective Bryan Garner, Chief Fire Officer 
Charles McGarvey, Deputy Fire Marshall Frank Hand, and 
State Trooper Robert Pomponio.  The complaint was brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged, inter alia, malicious 
prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, violation 
of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights due to 
fabrication, suppression, and destruction of evidence, 
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conspiracy claims under Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the defendant 
government entities, and various state law claims. 
 
 The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On September 21, 2015, the District 
Court granted the motions to dismiss all of the federal claims 
and declined jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.  
In particular, the District Court dismissed Black’s malicious 
prosecution claim because it determined Black never 
experienced the types of liberty restrictions that constitute a 
Fourth Amendment seizure.  Next, the District Court 
determined that the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 
for fabricated evidence could not succeed because our 
decision in Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014), 
requires a conviction for such a claim, and Black was 
acquitted at trial.  Finally, the District Court dismissed the 
conspiracy and Monell claims because Black could not 
succeed on the underlying malicious prosecution or due 
process claims.  Black filed a timely appeal. 
 
II.4 
 
 Our review of the granting of a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary.  McGovern v. City of Phila., 
554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  “To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  We must 
“accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine 
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the 
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips v. Cty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation 
marks omitted).   
                                              
4 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the 
section 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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III. 
 
 A plaintiff seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must 
demonstrate “that the defendants, acting under color of law, 
violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory 
rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.”  Elmore 
v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, 
section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but rather a 
mechanism to vindicate rights afforded by the Constitution or 
a federal statute.  Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 
(1979).  Black argues that the District Court erred in 
dismissing her Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
claim and her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process 
claim for fabrication of evidence.  We agree.   
 
A. 
 
 To prove a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant initiated a 
criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his 
favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without 
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a 
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the 
plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the 
concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”  
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added).  Black challenges the District Court’s dismissal of her 
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim based on its 
determination that she was not “seized” by the defendants.   
 
1. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV.  The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, forged a 
general definition of the meaning of seizure:  “when [an] 
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has 
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”  392 U.S. 1, 
19 n.16 (1968).  The restraint by an officer must be “through 
means intentionally applied” as opposed to an unknowing act.  
Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).  A 
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traditional arrest by an officer is a commonly understood type 
of seizure.  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) 
(“An arrest, of course, qualifies as a ‘seizure’ of a ‘person’ . . 
. .”).  But the scope of what may be considered a seizure is 
broader than this common example and the Supreme Court 
has supplied some helpful guidance as to the parameters of 
the term.  See generally Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (“It is quite 
plain that the Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the 
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house 
and prosecution for crime . . . .”). 
 
An actual physical touching is not required to 
constitute a seizure of a person, but in the absence of a 
physical touching, there must be a submission to an officer’s 
show of authority.  California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 
(1991).  As a corollary, the deprivation or restraint of a 
person’s liberty may be physical, or it may be that “in view of 
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to 
leave.”  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980) (plurality).  Cf. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 
255 (2007) (“[T]he ‘coercive effect of the encounter’ can be 
measured . . . by asking whether ‘a reasonable person would 
feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise 
terminate the encounter.’” (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991)).  So, while an officer merely asking 
a citizen questions may not be a seizure, circumstances 
indicating a seizure might include “the threatening presence 
of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, 
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use 
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with 
the officer’s request might be compelled.”  Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. at 554 (plurality); see, e.g., Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255 
(“The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic 
stop entails a seizure of the driver even though the purpose of 
the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” 
(quotation makes omitted)); Brower, 489 U.S. at 598 (noting 
that officers’ use of a roadblock to stop petitioner’s car 
constituted a seizure of the petitioner and explaining “a 
roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to induce 
a voluntary stop, but [it] is designed to produce a stop by 
physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur”); 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (plurality) (holding that no 
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seizure occurred when agents approached a person to ask 
questions in a public place, and the agents identified 
themselves but did not display weapons, did not place 
demands upon the person, and were not wearing uniforms); 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (“In this case there can be no question, 
then, that Officer McFadden ‘seized’ petitioner . . . when he 
took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his 
clothing.”). 
 
In Albright v. Oliver, a plurality of the Supreme Court 
concluded that a party essentially claiming an officer 
maliciously prosecuted him cannot rely upon a substantive 
due process theory and held specifically that “it is the Fourth 
Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which 
petitioner Albright’s claim must be judged.”  510 U.S. 266, 
271 (1994).  Although the Court posited that Albright’s 
“surrender to the State’s show of authority constituted a 
seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,” id., the 
Court did not rule upon whether Albright’s claim would 
succeed under the Fourth Amendment because he failed to 
raise the issue, id. at 275.5    
 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurrence in Albright 
discussing the meaning of seizure and, in particular, what we 
have termed a “continuing seizure.”  See, e.g., Schneyder v. 
Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011); DiBella v. Borough 
of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 602 (3d Cir. 2005).  Justice 
Ginsburg first noted that consideration of the common law 
may assist today’s understanding of what constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment seizure.  Albright, 510 U.S. at 277 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  She acknowledged that, “[a]t common law, an 
arrested person’s seizure was deemed to continue even after 
                                              
5 We have recognized that the lack of a decision on the merits 
of a Fourth Amendment claim in Albright “as well as the 
splintered views on the constitutional implications of 
malicious prosecution claims expressed in the various 
concurrences, has created great uncertainty in the law.”  Gallo 
v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 
Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that “Albright muddied the waters rather than 
clarified them”); Reed v. City of Chi., 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 
(7th Cir. 1996) (alluding to the “Albright minefield”)).   
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release from official custody.”  Id. at 277-78.  Noting that the 
common law purposes of arrest and other means such as bail 
are to compel a person to appear in court, Justice Ginsburg 
recognized that “[t]he common law thus seems to have 
regarded the difference between pretrial incarceration and 
other ways to secure a defendant’s court attendance as a 
distinction between methods of retaining control over a 
defendant’s person, not one between seizure and its 
opposite.”  Id. at 278.  Justice Ginsberg determined that this 
concept of seizure comports with “common sense” as well as 
“common understanding,” and explained: 
 
A person facing serious criminal charges is hardly 
freed from the state’s control upon his release from a 
police officer’s physical grip.  He is required to appear 
in court at the state’s command.  He is often subject, as 
in this case, to the condition that he seek formal 
permission from the court (at significant expense) 
before exercising what would otherwise be his 
unquestioned right to travel outside the jurisdiction.  
Pending prosecution, his employment prospects may 
be diminished severely, he may suffer reputational 
harm, and he will experience the financial and 
emotional strain of preparing a defense.   
 
A defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers 
greater burdens.  That difference, however, should not 
lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial 
is not still “seized” in the constitutionally relevant 
sense.  Such a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he 
remains apprehended, arrested in his movements, 
indeed “seized” for trial, so long as he is bound to 
appear in court and answer the state’s charges.  He is 
equally bound to appear, and is hence “seized” for 
trial, when the state employs the less strong-arm means 
of a summons in lieu of arrest to secure his presence in 
court. 
 
Id. at 278-79.   
 
We have described the analysis in Justice Ginsburg’s 
Albright concurrence as “compelling and supported by 
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Supreme Court case law,”6 Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 
217, 223 (3d Cir. 1998), and have expressly adopted her 
concept of “continuing seizure,” Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 319.  
Further, we have explained that under this view, “[p]re-trial 
restrictions of liberty aimed at securing a suspect’s court 
attendance are all ‘seizures’ . . . [because] the difference 
between detention in jail, release on bond, and release subject 
to compliance with other conditions is in the degree of 
restriction on the individual’s liberty, not in the kind of 
restriction.”  Id. at 320. 
 
 We subsequently applied Justice Ginsburg’s analysis 
to determine whether a person was seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  In Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, we 
held that a plaintiff seeking section 1983 relief for violation 
of his Fourth Amendment rights was seized post-indictment 
because he had to post a $10,000 bond, attend court hearings 
including his trial and arraignment, contact Pretrial Services 
on a weekly basis, and was prohibited from travelling outside 
of two states, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.  161 F.3d at 222.  
Noting that we had adopted “a broad approach in considering 
what constitutes a seizure,” id. at 224, we concluded “that the 
combination of restrictions imposed upon Gallo, because they 
intentionally limited his liberty, constituted a seizure,” id. at 
225.      
 
In contrast, in DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, we 
held that the plaintiffs were not seized when “only issued a 
summons; they were never arrested; they never posted bail; 
they were free to travel; and they did not have to report to 
Pretrial Services.”  407 F.3d at 603.  We noted that unlike the 
“significant pretrial restrictions”7 imposed in Gallo, the 
                                              
6 For instance, we have noted that in Justices of Boston 
Municipal Court v. Lyon, 466 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1984), the 
Supreme Court held that release on personal recognizance 
falls within the definition of “in custody” under the federal 
habeas corpus statute, and have reasoned that this holding “is 
relevant given that both seizure and custody concern 
governmental restriction of the freedom of those suspected of 
crime.”  Gallo, 161 F.3d at 223.    
7 We reiterate here that “[w]e hold open the possibility that 
some conditions of pre-trial release may be so insignificant as 
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plaintiffs’ liberty in DiBella was restricted only during their 
municipal court trial and that merely attending trial does 
amount to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Id.  We 
further explained that “[p]retrial custody and some onerous 
types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth 
Amendment seizure.”  Id.   
 
2. 
 
 Turning to the facts alleged in this case and applying 
pertinent case law, we conclude that Black was seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.  Black, insofar as she was 
charged with arson and other crimes, meets Justice 
Ginsburg’s threshold of “[a] person facing serious criminal 
charges.”  Albright, 510 U.S. at 278 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  Black’s liberty was subject to constitutionally 
significant restraints by the defendants, according to the 
complaint. 
 
 Less than one month after being interrogated by police 
and accused of committing arson,8 Black flew from her home 
in California to Pennsylvania for her arraignment because an 
arrest warrant had been issued and she had been directed to 
return.  See Gallo, 161 F.3d at 223 (“When he was obliged to 
go to court and answer the charges against him, Gallo, like 
the plaintiff in Terry, was brought to a stop. . . . [I]t is difficult 
to distinguish this kind of halt from the exercise of authority 
deemed to be a seizure in Terry.”).  She spent more than an 
hour being fingerprinted and photographed at a police station 
— and she was clearly not free to leave.  See Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 554 (plurality).  Black was required to post 
unsecured bail of $50,000.  She was told that the bond would 
be forfeited if she did not attend all court proceedings — 
compelling her to travel across the United States to attend 
pre-trial hearings.  Even though Black was never 
incarcerated, that “should not lead to the conclusion that a 
                                                                                                     
to not implicate constitutionally protected liberty interests.”  
Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 321 n.12. 
8 We note that after Black was interrogated, Fallon warned 
Black that if she did not surrender at a later date she would be 
arrested in California, remain in custody until extradited, and 
remain in jail until arraignment.   
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defendant released pretrial is not still ‘seized’ in the 
constitutionally relevant sense.”  Albright, 510 U.S. at 279 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).  Further, the cloud of very serious 
charges demonstrates that Black was “hardly freed from the 
state’s control upon [her] release from a police officer’s 
physical grip.”  Id. at 278.  
 
The defendants seek to distinguish this case from other 
similar cases by pointing out that the Pennsylvania state court 
handling Black’s criminal proceedings did not impose a 
formal limitation on her travel.  However, in Gallo, we 
determined that the plaintiff’s “liberty was restrained through 
travel restrictions and mandatory court appearances.”  161 
F.3d at 225 (emphasis added); see also id. at 224-25 
(“[C]onstraints on Gallo’s freedom were not limited to 
restrictions on his travel, he was also compelled to attend all 
court hearings.”).  Accordingly, it is significant that Black 
was required to fly from California to Pennsylvania for 
twelve pre-trial conferences in just a year “to appear in court 
at the state’s command.”  Albright, 510 U.S. at 278 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 
105, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We have consistently held that a 
post-arraignment defendant who is ‘obligated to appear in 
court in connection with [criminal] charges whenever his 
attendance [i]s required’ suffers a Fourth Amendment 
deprivation of liberty.” (quoting Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 
938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997)).  Black was forced to travel this 
great distance — presumably at great expense — a dozen 
times to defend herself.  This demonstrates that Black was 
“scarcely at liberty; [s]he remain[ed] apprehended, arrested in 
[her] movements, indeed ‘seized’ for trial, so long as [s]he 
[was] bound to appear in court and answer the state’s 
charges.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 279 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  In contrast to Gallo and DiBella, Black did not 
live in the jurisdiction where she was tried and if she did not 
travel, she faced serious charges and a possibility of 
incarceration.  Further, Black’s life was presumably disrupted 
by the compulsion that she travel out of state a dozen times.  
See generally id. at 278 (“Pending prosecution, [her] 
employment prospects may be diminished severely, [s]he 
may suffer reputational harm, and [s]he will experience the 
financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense.”).  
Black’s circumstances demonstrate that she experienced 
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“constitutionally significant restrictions on [her] freedom of 
movement for the purpose of obtaining h[er] presence at a 
judicial proceeding” and she was “seized within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”  Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 321-22.  
 
Considering the totality of the circumstances alleged, 
Black has sufficiently alleged that her liberty was 
intentionally restrained by the defendants.  Accordingly, we 
will vacate the District Court’s determination that she was not 
seized as is required for a Fourth Amendment malicious 
prosecution claim. 
 
B. 
 
 We next consider Black’s Fourteenth Amendment due 
process claim for fabrication of evidence.  Black has alleged 
that defendants Fallon and Hand conspired with the other 
defendants and deliberately fabricated, suppressed, and 
destroyed evidence from the inception of their investigation 
through the trial of the criminal case against her.  Relying on 
our opinion in Halsey v. Pfeiffer, the District Court ruled that 
Black’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for 
fabricated evidence must fail because Halsey requires a 
conviction for such a claim, and she was acquitted at trial.   
 
 The legal question before us is whether a plaintiff may 
pursue a fabricated evidence9 claim against state actors under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even if 
the plaintiff was never convicted.  While we held in Halsey 
that a fabricated evidence claim could proceed when a 
plaintiff was convicted at trial, we explicitly left open the 
question of whether such a claim would be viable if a plaintiff 
was acquitted.  Consistent with other Courts of Appeals that 
have considered this question, as well as our reasoning in 
Halsey, we now hold that such a stand-alone fabrication of 
evidence claim can proceed if there is no conviction.  
 
                                              
9 We acknowledge that Black has alleged a variety of 
wrongful acts including fabrication, suppression, and 
destruction of evidence.  For the ease of reference, we will 
refer to her allegations collectively as fabrication of evidence. 
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 We begin our analysis by examining our decision in 
Halsey.  Much of our discussion in that decision centered 
upon which constitutional right was implicated by a 
fabricated evidence claim and, ultimately, whether there 
could be a stand-alone claim for fabrication of evidence.  750 
F.3d at 288-96.  The defendants rightly conceded that 
fabrication of evidence would deny a defendant due process 
of law,10 but they argued that a plaintiff could only seek 
redress through a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
action, as “the two claims are intertwined and . . .  the former 
[a due process claim] can only exist as a portion of the latter 
[a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim].”  Id. at 
290.  The plaintiff countered that the Fourteenth Amendment 
due process clause protects the right to be free from evidence 
that is fabricated by state actors and is independent of a 
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.  Id. at 290-
91.  Viewing both types of claims, we recognized that not all 
of the plaintiff’s allegations may “fall under the traditional 
definition of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
claim.”  Id. at 292.  Further, we observed the untenable 
possibility “that there would not be a redressable 
constitutional violation when a state actor used fabricated 
evidence in a criminal proceeding if the plaintiff suing the 
actor could not prove the elements of a malicious prosecution 
case, such as the lack of probable cause for the prosecution.”  
Id.  We also observed that “[w]hen falsified evidence is used 
as a basis to initiate the prosecution of a defendant, or is used 
to convict him, the defendant has been injured regardless of 
whether the totality of the evidence, excluding the fabricated 
evidence, would have given the state actor a probable cause 
defense in a malicious prosecution action that a defendant 
later brought against him.”  Id. at 289.  As a result, we 
rejected the defendants’ argument that claims of evidence 
fabrication must be tied to malicious prosecution cases.  Id. at 
                                              
10 Indeed, we observed that “[t]o the best of our knowledge, 
every court of appeals that has considered the question of 
whether a state actor has violated [a] defendant’s right to due 
process of law by fabricating evidence to charge or convict 
the defendant has answered the question in the affirmative.  
See Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 585 (7th Cir. 
2012) (collecting court of appeals cases).”  Halsey, 750 F.3d 
at 292. 
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292.11  We supported this view by noting “that no sensible 
concept of ordered liberty is consistent with law enforcement 
cooking up its own evidence.”  Id. at 292-93.    
 
Addressing the issue presented in Halsey we held, 
accordingly, that “if a defendant has been convicted at a trial 
at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the 
defendant has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based 
on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the 
defendant would not have been convicted.”  Id. at 294.  
Nonetheless, we explicitly left open the question we face 
today.  Id. at 294 n.19 (“Nor do we decide whether a 
defendant acquitted at a trial where fabricated evidence has 
been used against him has an actionable section 1983 claim.” 
(emphasis added)).  The defendants seem to argue, inter alia, 
that because we cautioned that courts in our circuit should not 
use the Halsey decision “beyond the scope of our holding,” 
id. at 295, we have already foreclosed the question.   
 
 We see no reason to require a conviction as a 
prerequisite to a stand-alone due process claim against a state 
actor for fabrication of evidence.  The harm we were 
concerned with in Halsey — corruption of the trial process — 
occurs whether or not one is convicted.  It would be indeed 
anomalous if an attentive jury correctly saw through 
fabricated evidence, and its acquittal categorically barred later 
                                              
11 Noting that the boundary between the Fourteenth and 
Fourth Amendments “is, at its core, temporal,” we observed 
in Halsey that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unlawful seizure extends until trial whereas the due process of 
law guarantee “is not so limited as it protects defendants 
during an entire criminal proceeding through and after trial.”  
Id. at 291.  We determined, however, drawing a precise line 
between claims invoking the two rights was unnecessary in 
Halsey (as in the present case) because the fabrication of 
evidence allegedly infected the entirety of the criminal 
proceeding, from securing the indictment through trial.  Id.; 
see also id. (“Wherever the boundary between the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims lies, it is in the rear view 
mirror by the end of trial, when Fourth Amendment rights no 
longer are implicated.”). 
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relief to the criminal defendant.  Such a result would insulate 
the ineffective fabricator of evidence while holding 
accountable only the skillful fabricator.  Fabricated evidence 
is an affront to due process of law, and state actors seeking to 
frame citizens undermine fundamental fairness and are 
responsible for “corruption of the truth-seeking function of 
the trial process.”  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 
(1976); see Napue v. People of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) 
(acknowledging the principle that state actors “may not 
knowingly use false evidence . . . [is] implicit in any concept 
of ordered liberty”).  The Supreme Court has explained that 
section 1983 is intended “to deter state actors from using the 
badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their 
federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if 
such deterrence fails.”  Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 
(1992).  A contrary holding would contravene the purposes of 
section 1983.  There is no meaningful reason why due process 
protections precluding fabricated evidence should turn on 
whether or not one is convicted at trial. 
 
 Our reasoning in Halsey makes no distinction between 
fabricated evidence leading to a wrongful conviction and 
wrongful criminal charges.  For example, we repeatedly 
referred to the injury of falsified evidence leading to wrongful 
initiation of prosecution.  See, e.g., 750 F.3d at 289 (“When 
falsified evidence is used as a basis to initiate the prosecution 
of a defendant, or is used to convict him, the defendant has 
been injured . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 294 n.19 (“[I]f 
fabricated evidence is used as a basis for a criminal charge 
that would not have been filed without its use the defendant 
certainly has suffered an injury.”).  Furthermore, when we 
explained in Halsey why the injury violated due process, we 
focused on the corruption of the trial process.  See id. at 293 
(“[W]e think it self-evident that a police officer’s fabrication 
and forwarding to prosecutors of known false evidence works 
an unacceptable corruption of the truth-seeking function of 
the trial process.” (quotation marks omitted and emphasis 
added)).  It is challenging to square away Halsey’s broad 
language about “law and fundamental justice,” id., with a 
requirement that one be convicted for a fabricated evidence 
claim to be viable; the harm of the fabrication is corrupting 
regardless of the outcome at trial or the particular time in the 
proceeding that the corruption occurs.  We stressed in Halsey 
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that we were not suggesting that “there is nothing wrong with 
the fabricating of evidence if it does not affect the final 
verdict.”  Id. at 295 n.20.   
 Others Courts of Appeals have permitted plaintiffs to 
pursue due process claims predicated on the fabrication of 
evidence notwithstanding the fact, as here, that the plaintiff 
was not convicted of criminal charges.  See, e.g., Cole v. 
Carson, 802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015); Weiland v. Palm Beach 
Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Zahrey 
v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. 
Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1997).  For instance, in 
Cole, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized “a 
due process right not to have police deliberately fabricate 
evidence and use it to frame and bring false charges against a 
person.”  802 F.3d at 771.  The court noted that deliberate 
framing by officials “offends the most strongly held values of 
our nation.”  Id. at 772.  Accordingly, the court determined 
that “even when a trial functions properly to vindicate a 
person’s innocence,” fabrication of evidence deprives a 
person of his or her due process rights.  Id. at 767.  The court 
“held that a victim of intentional fabrication of evidence by 
officials is denied due process when he is either convicted or 
acquitted.”  Id. at 768 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[A] 
conviction [is] a requirement we have not insisted upon.”).12  
                                              
12 Two Courts of Appeals appear to require a conviction as a 
prerequisite to a stand-alone due process claim.  See 
Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“[A] police officer does not violate an acquitted defendant’s 
due process rights when he fabricates evidence.”); Massey v. 
Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 354 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Fabrication of 
evidence alone is insufficient to state a claim for a due 
process violation; a plaintiff must plead adequate facts to 
establish that the loss of liberty — i.e., his conviction and 
subsequent incarceration — resulted from the fabrication.”).  
While the Massey court provided very little analysis to 
support its holding, the Saunders-El court noted that the only 
“‘liberty deprivation’” in a fabricated evidence case where 
one is acquitted “‘stems from his initial arrest.’”  Id. at 561 
(quoting Alexander v. McKinney, 692 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 
2012)).  The Saunders-El court rejected the view that “‘the 
burden of appearing in court and attending trial, in and of 
itself, constitute[s] a deprivation of liberty [because] [i]t 
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 Accordingly, we hold that an acquitted criminal 
defendant may have a stand-alone fabricated evidence claim 
against state actors under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that, absent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not 
have been criminally charged.  In Halsey, we required a 
“reasonable likelihood” that a defendant would not have been 
convicted absent the fabricated evidence, and that standard 
was merely based on principles of causation.  750 F.3d at 294 
n.19.  The “reasonable likelihood” standard we employ 
simply requires that a plaintiff draw a “meaningful 
connection” between her particular due process injury and the 
use of fabricated evidence against her.  See id.; see also 
Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Like a tort plaintiff, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish both 
causation in fact and proximate causation.”).   
 
 Aside from the causation requirement, there are other 
hurdles facing a plaintiff alleging a due process violation for 
fabrication of evidence.  For instance, as we cautioned in 
Halsey, a civil plaintiff’s fabricated evidence claim should not 
survive summary judgment unless he can demonstrate that the 
fabricated evidence “was so significant that it could have 
affected the outcome of the criminal case.”  See Halsey, 750 
F.3d at 295.  In addition, there is a notable bar for evidence to 
be considered “fabricated.”  We have noted that “testimony 
that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as 
fabricated merely because it turns out to have been wrong.”  
Id.  There must be “persuasive evidence supporting a 
conclusion that the proponents of the evidence” are aware that 
evidence is incorrect or that the evidence is offered in bad 
faith.  Id.  For these reasons, we reiterate that “we expect that 
it will be an unusual case in which a police officer cannot 
obtain a summary judgment in a civil action charging him 
                                                                                                     
would be anomalous to hold that attending a trial deprives a 
criminal defendant of liberty.’”  Id. (quoting Alexander, 692 
F.3d at 557 n.2).  As explained in Subsection III(A) supra, 
however, we take a broader view of the liberty deprivations 
occasioned by the criminal process.  Further, considering our 
Court’s concern in Halsey and in this decision with the 
corruption of the truth-seeking process of trial, we disagree 
with Saunders-El. 
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with having fabricated evidence used in an earlier criminal 
case.”  Id. at 295.13 
 
 We conclude that Black’s acquittal does not preclude 
her claim that the defendants intentionally fabricated evidence 
in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, we will vacate and remand the 
District Court’s dismissal of Black’s fabrication of evidence 
claim.14  
 
IV. 
 
                                              
13 The procedural posture of this case is a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim and we thus assume all of the facts 
alleged are true.  The evidence may tell a different story and 
we express no opinion as to whether summary judgment may 
be appropriate at a later time. 
14 Black also asks us to vacate the dismissal of her conspiracy 
claims and claims under Monell.  Because the District Court 
reasoned that Black could not succeed on her underlying 
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution or Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claims, it correctly determined that 
she could not succeed on her conspiracy claims.  See, e.g., 
Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he 
plaintiff is additionally required to prove a deprivation of a 
constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 
civil conspiracy claim.”).  Similarly, the District Court 
correctly reasoned that the Monell claims against defendants 
Lower Merion Township and Montgomery County require a 
constitutional deprivation, but the District Court already 
dismissed the underlying malicious prosecution and due 
process claims.  See, e.g., Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health 
Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“[F]or there to be municipal liability, there still 
must be a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”).  
Because we vacate the District Court’s determination 
regarding both the underlying malicious prosecution and due 
process claims, we will vacate on the conspiracy and Monell 
claims as well.   
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
